| Lord Styphon |
Jun 2, 2007 10:06 PM |
I'm assuming that by "violated", you meant "left using the mechanism for withdrawal in the treaty". And that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty led to a new agreement between the sides.
This is about more than just the Russians being irked over withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, as the rest of its recent actions, which target Europe as much (or, in some cases, more) as they do America, have indicated.
The Economist's position on Russia for those interested:
Quote:
The West and Russia
Speak truth to power
May 31st 2007
From The Economist print edition
Changing Russia's behaviour is devilishly difficult. But that is no excuse for not trying
Get article background
DEMONSTRATORS thrashed on the streets of Moscow; the impending mugging of another big energy firm, this one part-owned by BP; cyberwarfare against a small neighbour; the bellicose testing of a new ballistic missile, supposedly able to bypass the American missile-defence system about which the Kremlin fulminates—and all that was only in the past fortnight. When the G8 group of rich countries meets next week in Germany, one of its biggest if unadvertised concerns will be the snarling behaviour of one of its own members, Vladimir Putin's Russia—and the urgent need for a more coherent Western policy towards it.
The behaviour, and the dilemma, stem from Russia's explosive combination of strength and weakness. High oil prices, and the world's largest oil-and-gas reserves, have helped pay off most of Russia's debt. They have also fuelled Mr Putin's increasingly assertive diplomacy, while boosting the living standards of many Russians. In some ways, the seven years of his presidency have been among the least bad periods in Russia's history, which helps to explain his popularity—but so does his neutering of the media, strangulation of political opposition and suborning of parliament and elections. That grip counts as a strength in Mr Putin's book; in fact, the authoritarian system he has built is corrupt and unstable—witness the Kremlin in-fighting and increasingly paranoid repression of dissent ahead of his departure from office next year. The economy, meanwhile, is over-reliant on natural resources and perilously unequal. Add to that a demographic catastrophe and continuing trouble in the north Caucasus (see article), and the picture darkens further.
This new Russia, strident but erratic, requires a subtler approach than either the straightforward rivalry of Soviet times or the handouts and advice (not always very helpful) offered to Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s. The inclination of most Western leaders most of the time has been to coddle or appease Mr Putin, rather than confront him—because they have been deluded about his real goals and motives, or distracted by other crises, or divided by the Kremlin's gas deals.
So it was that at last year's G8 summit, in St Petersburg, Mr Putin openly derided both George Bush and Tony Blair, while precious little was said in public about Russia's obvious abandonment of democracy or its abrasive foreign policy. Compared with that, Britain's decision to press for the extradition of the ex-KGB officer suspected of committing radioactive murder in London last year represents a welcome stiffening of tone. More stern talk at this year's G8, from more leaders, about the Kremlin's threats to Western interests and to those of its own citizens—the expropriation of energy assets harms both—would be better than diplomatic platitudes.
But the truth is that, with the Kremlin in its current mood, even robust tickings-off will not change Russia's trajectory. Censorship will prevent most Russians from hearing them; with their zero-sum attitude to diplomacy, some in the Kremlin interpret criticism as evidence that its policies are biting. Yet the harsher measures that some, especially in America, advocate—such as keeping Russia out of the WTO, or kicking it out of the G8 itself—are more likely to do harm than good. They would feed the widespread belief that the encircling West is bent on weakening Russia (Mr Putin himself avowedly sees complaints about his human-rights record as disguised efforts to impede his pursuit of greatness). They would probably encourage even more draconian measures at home; and they would reduce Russia's incentive to co-operate on difficult issues, such as Kosovo and Iran, where its weight could help.
The Russia beyond
There are other possibilities between cringing platitudes and pyrotechnic rows. The Kremlin needs to be told that it does not have an automatic veto in global diplomacy, even in its old sphere of influence, and even if such a veto is attempted in the United Nations Security Council, as it may be on independence for Kosovo. Neighbouring countries such as Georgia (victim of an unjust trade embargo), Estonia (cyberwar) and especially Ukraine, with a crucial parliamentary vote later this year, must be helped to fend off Russian bullying.
Given Mr Putin's power to select his own successor, the West also needs to concentrate on longer-term measures, such as supporting those independent media and lobby groups that still exist in Russia—even when the Kremlin denounces them as spies. The aim must be to ensure that whatever comes after Putinism is better for Russia, and for the world.
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http://economist.com/opinion/display...ory_id=9257663
Earlier piece: The big chill |
